litigation when combined with information not known at the

time of the prosecution to any person substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application.

Reply: Paragraph (a) of §1.56 makes it clear that the Office recognizes that the duty to disclose material information is limited to such information which is known by an individual substantively involved in the preparation or processition of the substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application. Thus, while information may be material under the definition of §1.56(b)(1), there can be no duty to disclose the information if it is material only in combination with unknown information.

Comment 30. One comment stated that proposed § 1.56(b) should comment succession and proposed §1.50(b) should be modified so that paragraph (b)(1) refers to information that renders a claim unpatentable ("but for"), paragraph (b)(2) remains as proposed, and a paragraph (b)(3) is added to include the definition of materiality as "the closest information over which any pending claim patentably defines." This comment suggested but this medified definition would have the educations of the comment suggested. that this modified definition would have the advan-tage of not requiring the applicant to submit references which applicant knows are immaterial and to then engage in "straw man" arguments based on such references.

ments based on such received.

Reply: The suggested modification to § 1.56 has not been adopted. The suggested language would seemingly require information to be filed in each application, whether the information is relevant or not, since the "closest information" would be required. Sec-tion 1.56 does not require information which is not relevant to be submitted, but only information which meets the definition of material as set out in the rule.

Comment 31. One comment stated that if proposed \$1.56(b)(1) is promulgated, there would be no need for proposed §1.56(b)(2) with regard to information which would make a prima facie case of unpatentability and other information required by paragraph (b)(2) might be obscure. Another comment argued that paragraph (b)(2) was unnecessary, confusing and ambiguous and suggested changes in the language to make the requirement clear and less ambiguous.

Reply: The suggestion as to the language change to \$1.56(b)(2) has been adopted. The final rule language avoids the perceived problem of requiring an applicant to submit information supporting a position taken by the examiner. It is not appropriate, however, to eliminate paragraph (b)(2) because it is an essential part of the definition of information material to patentability and will help to ensure that all material facts are brought to the steption of the examiner during the examiner to the examiner during the examiner to the examiner during the examiner to the examiner to the examiner during the examiner to t attention of the examiner during the examination process.

Comment 32. One comment questioned the language of proposed §1.56(b)(2) as to how an applicant could consider a prior art reference as supporting a position of unpatentability taken by the Office while at the same time disputing that interpretation. Reply: The language of §1.56(b)(2) has been modified to clarify that information is material to patentability if it refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in (1) opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (2) asserting an argument of patentability.

Comment 33. One comment stated that \$1.56(b)(2) was flawed

in requiring a duty to conduct a file search to make sure that no information exists which even arguably contradicts a position taken or to be taken in response to the examiner, or which

supports the examiner's position which may be improper.

Reply: Section 1.56(b)(2) does not require a search of files.

Under §1.56(a), the duty of disclosure is confined to that information which is known to an individual to be material as defined in paragraph (b).

Comment 34. One continent stated that proposed §1.56(c) should be modified so that the duty of any individual designated as having a duty of disclosure would terminate when such individual ceases to be substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application. The comment used, as an example, an inventor who would not be aware of art cited by the examiner which would cause information known to the inventor to fall within the definition of materiality for the first time.

Reply: The suggestion in the comment is not adopted. The duty to disclose information material to patentability rests on the individuals designated in § 1.56(c) until the application issues as a patent or becomes abandoned. Paragraph (a) of § 1.56 makes it clear, however, that each individual has a duty to disclose only information which is known to that individual to be material. Comment 35. One comment stated that proposed §1.56(c)(3) should not include the assignee, or anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application, in the class of those who have a duty to disclose material information since there might be a "witch hunt" during litigation to find one employee with knowledge of, or possession of, information that should have been disclosed.

Reply: No modification to \$1.56(c)(3) is needed since \$1.56 sets forth that only individuals who are associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application have a duty of candor and good faith, including a duty to disclose to the Office all informa-

tion known to be material to patentability.

Comment 36. One comment stated that proposed § 1.56(d) should be revised to expressly allow an inventor to satisfy the duty by disclosing information to the practitioner who prepares or prosecutes the application so that redundant information disclosure statements will not be required from both the inventor and the attorney or agent.

Reply: The suggestion in the comment is not adopted since the duty as described in \$1.56 will be met as long as the information in question was cited by the Office or submitted to the Office in in question was cited by §§1.97(b)-(d) and 1.98 before issuance of the patent. Statements from both an inventor and the practitioner are not required to be submitted.

Comment 37. One comment stated that proposed \$\$1.52(c) and 1.67(c) should be modified to either (1) expressly permit alterations to be made in an application subsequent to the signing of the oath or declaration if a supplemental oath or declaration is later submitted, or (2) more properly, prohibit such alterations are desirable, they can be made and the application can be filed with an unsigned oath or declaration. Another comment stated that willfully filling out false oaths should never be condoned.

Reply: The Office does not condone willfully filling out false oaths. Further, \$10.23(c))(11) indicates that the Office considers it misconduct for a practitioner to knowingly file or cause to be filed an application containing a material alteration made after the signing of an accompanying oath or declaration without identifying the alteration. The Office will not consider striking an application in which an alteration was made, but a supplemental oath or declaration is required to be filed in an application containing alterations made after the signing of the oath or declaration

Comment 38. One comment stated that the implementation of proposed §§1.63(b)(3) and 1.175(a)(7) allows for a two-month delay in the deadline for requiring declarations complying therewith

Reply: The averments in oath or declaration forms presently in use that comply with the previous §1.63 or §1.175 will also comply with the requirements of the new rules. Therefore, the Office will continue to accept the old oath or declaration forms

Comment 39. Five comments questioned the need for the proposed rules since statistics show that information disclosure statements are submitted early in prosecution and questioned what new service is being provided for the proposed fee in § 1.97. Reply: The Office desires to continue to encourage information to be submitted promptly so that it can be considered by the examiner when the first Office action is prepared. Some people have expressed a desire to have the option of waiting to submit information until after the first Office action, without concern that they will be subject to a charge of inequitable conduct. Section 1.97(c), as amended, will provide this option to applicants in that information will be considered later than three months after the filing date of the application (§1.97(a) prior to amendment) without a showing of promptness (prior§1.99). The fee will compensate the Office for the added expense caused by the late submission of the information and will serve as a disincentive to the intentional withholding of information even for a short period of time.

Comment 40. Two comments suggested that proposed §1.97(a) be modified so that the mechanism of proposed §1.98 would not be the only acceptable technique for submitting information.

Reply: The Office has set forth the minimum requirements for information to be considered in §§1.97 and 1.98. These rules will provide certainty for the public of exactly what the requirements are, when the Office will consider information and when the Office will not consider information. Thus, applicants are provided with means for complying with the duty of disclosure by following the rules. If information is submitted in a manner so that it is not considered by the Office, applicant will assume the

